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Abstract
This work presents an empirical analysis of the evolution of the Spanish peseta in the 
EMS. Previously, the basic target zone model is explained and some extensions introduced. These 
extensions are the consideration of devaluation risks, capital controls and the possibility of 
sterilized interventions. The empirical part consists in applying a Kalman filter to the series to 
obtain an unobserved components decomposition for the interest rate differentials. The empirical 
evidence does not support the target zone model for Spain: the interest rate differentials have 
largely reflected realignment risks, rather than exchange rate expectations within the band.
We are grateful to M. Salmon, F. Canova and A. Maravall for their many useful 
comments. Special thanks are also due to our colleagues S. Fabrizio, J. Stanton-Ife and 
























































































































































































This paper studies the evidence of the target-zone models for Spain from the 
entry of the peseta in the European Monetary System (EMS) until its first 
realignment, covering a period over three years. We apply the Kalman filter to a 
linear approximation of the theoretical target zone model in order to obtain an 
unobserved components decomposition for the interest rate differentials.
Section I briefly develops the basic target zone model and discusses some 
extensions: introduction of a devaluation risk, capital controls and the possibility of 
sterilized interventions; these considerations may interfere with the basic theoretical 
relation in practice. Actually, the outcome of the empirical analysis carried out in 
section II does not support the basic model; once the extensions-conveyed in a single 
parameter (c,)- are considered, the target zone is not found to influence the interest 
differentials, as the theory would predict. Section III interprets the results and 
stresses the importance of the credibility component to explain the gap in the interest 
rate differentials. The conclusions summarize the results and provide an explanation 
for the evolution of the realignment risk, highlighting the reasons which led to the 
first realignment of the peseta in the EMS.
I-Target-zone basic model and extensions
The disciplinary mechanism of the EMS is the most outstanding 
example of target zone. The rules of the EMS imply the intervention of the central 
banks of the system to defend the band around an institutionally-fixed central 
parity1. Consequently the EMS is a system of semifixed but adjustable exchange 
rates, which can be studied in the framework of the target-zone models, which were 
first proposed by Krugman (1990).
From a simple monetary model of exchange rate determination in which the 
Interest Parity Condition (IP) holds in the strong form of the Uncovered Parity (UCP), 
we obtain the known result that the current level of exchange rate (s,) depends both 
on economic factors-fundamentals (/,)-and on the expectations of the future exchange 
rate, which are in turn determined by the future expected value of the fundamentals:
ds
s - f  + 6 E __I
' ' '  1 dt
[U
where (5 is the semielasticity of the demand of money to the interest rate and
For details about the functioning of the EMS see, for instance, Giavazzi & 





























































































vr  m;.W(y; y )
[21
m being the (log) money supply and y the (log) level of output. The asterisks indicate 
foreign country's variables and the model is expressed in continuous time. It is 
convenient to make the above separation in the definition of the fundamentals, for 
the money supply constitutes the policy instrument in this framework2.
Assumming that the changes in f  (df) follow a Brownian motion, with drift i±:
the exchange rate in a free float regime-that is when the fundamentals are not 
constrained - is simply:
where the expectation equals the drift. This yields the solid 45-degrees line in Fig l.B.
However, in a target zone the monetary authorities are expected to defend the 
band through interventions at the edges of the band (marginal interventions), 
constraining the behaviour of the fundamentals, which now follow a regulated 
Brownian motion of the type:
where the regulators dL,dU are only activated when the exchange rate reaches the 
lower or upper bands, respectively. This institutional setup influences the 
expectations of the agents: under a perfectly credible target zone there is an 
increasing appreciation expectation for the exchange rate as it approaches the upper 
limit of fluctuation and viceversa. This brings about the 'honeymoon effect' 
mentioned by the literature, since the expectations allow a higher divergence in the 
fundamentals, as the non-linear relationship (S-curve) plotted in Figure l.B displays.
The difficulties in the definition and measurement of the fundamentals make 
the interest rate differentials (b=i-i) which are directly observable, the convenient 
variable to use in the empirical part of the paper. The new relationship - which we 
will denote curve (6,s')- is easily derived by substituting the UCP condition 
underlying the model (b=E,(ds/dt)) in [1]:
2- We can contemplate both the exchange rate and fundamentals in terms of 
deviations from a central value (cc,s,cc/ respectively): s'=s-ccs, f= f-cc!. The central 
values are set to zero, as it is apparent from the graphs below, so the distinction is 
irrelevant, for the moment; however, when we wish to stress that we are 
contemplating the deviations from the central parity-mainly in the empirical analysis- 
we will use s',f.
df-^dt + adz [3]
[4]






























































































which is just the magnitude of the 'honeymoon effect'3. This is the main relationship 
of interest to us and it is displayed in l.C : At the lower (upper) part of the band, the 
interest differential is positive (negative) and equivalent smooth pasting conditions 
hold: under the strong assumptions of the model, a strict monetary policy which 
keeps fundamentals at negative levels means a positive interest rate differential which 
attracts capital and strengthens the currency, keeping it in the lower part of the band.
6
* * *
The structural characteristics of the economy (conveyed in our model by the 
parameters of the monetary model and the process which drives the fundamentals) 
and the institutional setup of the band (fluctuation bands, intervention rules) 
determine the features of the basic target zone model, as displayed in the previous 
figure. The basic model portrays several strong assumptions which, once relaxed, 
affect the results of the model and the ability of the authorities to defend the band. 
We intend to explain here their importance in the sustainability of the target zone, 
focusing on the effects on the (6,s') curve. The implicit condition behind the target 
zones caracteristic S-curve is that the authorities will be disciplined, keeping the 
range of variation of the fundamentals within the bounds of the target zone (/.</< 
f j  and hence, yielding the band perfectly credible. But this reasoning is at odds with 
the EMS experience: on the one hand, divergence remains after more than a decade 
while occasional realignments have taken place, meaning that the band has been at 
least occasionally not credible; on the other hand, other instruments have been used 
to defend the band, namely, capital controls and sterilized interventions. Now we turn 
to these issues.
Credibility
The credibility of the band depends, on the one hand, on the past 
behaviour of the system, its reputation: a system with frequent realignments is not 
a reputed system since the agents will take into account the system's past 
performance when forming their expectations. In a parallel way, a band which has 
been successfully defended even in objectively difficult circumstances renders the 
system more credible. From this perspective, the interaction between reputation and
3-Observe that in the free float case, the interest differential is constant and equal 




























































































credibility can be seen as a self-feeding mechanism: the defence of the band builds 
up a stock of reputation which delivers a flow of credibility, facilitating the defence 
of the band. However, in the expectations of the agents the future behaviour of the 
variables also play an important role, as the basic model highlights. Consequently, 
the lack of effective convergence in the fundamentals may jeopardize the previous 
gains in credibility.
In order to introduce credibility into the model, we use here the 'devaluation 
risk' approach following Svensson (1991,a) and Bertola & Svensson (1993) which 
allows for an adequate empirical treatment.
Recall that we are expressing both s and / in terms of deviations from the 
central parity (cc):
s ' r sr cc!’ f ' r f r cci [7]
If the band is not perfectly credible, the probability of realignments exists. A 
realignment can be expressed as a discrete jump in the central parity (dcc>0, for a 
devaluation). We can see the total exchange rate expectation as consisting of two 
components: the expected depreciation within the band E,(ds’/dt) and a realignment 
risk (g,):
_ ds _ dsE __- £ ___i f
1 dt 1 dt
[8]
where gt-E,(dcdldt). In order to solve the model, it is necessary to specify a stochastic 
process for g. The mentioned papers assume that it follows a Brownian motion, too; 
this specification conveys the case in which the devaluation risk is constant and 
allows for correlation between df and dg. The result of incorporating a devaluation 
risk (£>0)-with no correlation between the processes- into the model can be 
considered with the help of figures 2 and 3: regarding the fundamentals, the 
devaluation risk shifts the S-curve to the left by a magnitude of ag; the curve relating 
exchange rate and interest rate differential is also shifted-in this case upwards-by a 
magnitude equal to the devaluation risk g. Thus, the existence of a devaluation risk 
restricts the behaviour of the fundamentals (and the monetary policy) in the case of 
weak currencies (upper part of the band), while the opposite occurs for countries 
with strong currencies.
The components of the right hand side of [8] can also be expressed in terms 
of conditional expectations, as in Svensson (1993):
E — - E ( - \  )t ^  t ' ̂  no realignment'
[£ ,d s | E (^ S \





























































































where p, is the probability of realignment at time t, and the term in square brackets 
can be seen as the size of the expected realignment. Substituting the UCP condition 
in [8], we can easily see that:
a -F  ( ĈC,)-h  E (— \ 1 [10]
Of  A ^  ' t A ^  no realignment'
We will make use of this expression below. Finally, we can observe that if the 
devaluation risk changes in time any relationship between the position in the band 
and the effective interest rate differential is observable, since the curve would shift 
continuously. This implies that the observed relationship between both variables may 
be inconsistent with the theory if a variable devaluation risk is present.
Capital controls and sterilized interventions
Other instruments have helped historically to defend the band in the EMS. 
Capital controls and sterilized interventions have been used to postpone or soften the 
impact of actual convergence measures, since a straightforward adjustment may have 
implied undesirable consequences for the country.
The effective imposition of capital controls or the possibility of imposing them 
have constituted an important barrier to the integration of financial markets. 
Furthermore, the literature states that capital controls have played an outstanding role 
in maintaining the exchange rate stability in the EMS4 *, especially in turbulent 
periods.
As Giavazzi & Giovannini (1989) stress, the key variable to verify the 
importance of the controls is the differential between on-shore (id) and off-shore (ie) 
interest rates (denoted by d), since transactions in the Euromarkets are not subject to 
the imposition of capital controls while the domestic rates are. The existence of a 
positive differential would indicate the existence of controls for capital inflows, and 
viceversa.
Note that the underlying monetary model has as an argument the on-shore 
interest rates. Consequently, the IP for the model with capital controls would include 
them:
6 -id, id ;-E ,—- 1 d I11!on t  t t  ^  t
4-See Rogoff (1985) or Artis & Taylor (1988) for an econometric analysis of the




























































































The effects of incorporating capital controls into the model are equivalent to 
those of a devaluation risk: controls on inflows (positive d) shift the curve (6,s'.) 
horizontally upwards; controls on outflows (negative d) shift it downwards. It can be 
seen that the controls do not affect the behaviour of fundamentals but allow a higher 
divergence from their equilibrium values, providing the authorities with an additional 
tool to support the band. Notwithstanding, we can easily overcome the effect of 
capital controls in the empirical part by focusing our attention on the Eurorates 
differentials, where the UCP holds:
6 „-te - ie '-E —1 [12]
' ' ' dt
Following Obstfeld (1988) and Dominguez & Frankel (1990), sterilized 
interventions can be effective in affecting the exchange rate; other authors 
(Mastropasqua et. al. (1988)) assess their importance in the EMS. The effects of 
sterilized interventions are channeled through two mechanisms: the announcement 
effect and the portfolio effect.
The announcement effect in the context of a target zone is embedded in the 
institutional mechanisms of the EMS and has already been implicitly considered 
when tackling the credibility issue: A continued and decisive defence of the band- 
with the corresponding variation in the reserve stock- allows gains in credibility3.
The portfolio effect operates through the equilibrium condition of the portfolio 
model of exchange rate determination and pressuposses that the assets, once the 
exchange risk is taken into account- are not perfect substitutes. The Central Bank 
could then sterilize its interventions in the foreign exchange, since changes in its 
assets position would affect the exchange rate equilibrium, without changes in the 
money supply or the on-shore interest rate. However, the perfect substitutability 
hypothesis is a strong assumption to relax, especially when Euromarkets are 
considered; actually, the mentioned empirical evidence on sterilized interventions 
concludes that the announcement effect is much more important than the portfolio 5
5- We can also understand in this context the possibility of speculative attacks in 
a target zone contemplated in the literature-see Krugman & Rothemberg (1990): the 
depletion of reserves may render the band unsustainable through intervention and 
this raises doubts on the future defence of the band, which may trigger a speculative 
attack or, less dramatically, an increase of the devaluation risk.
The references above do not consider the announcement effect in the context 
of a target zone. However, the underlying reasoning is the same, with the only 
difference that in a target zone the agents know the purpose of the authorities: 
defending the band. A more extended digression on the announcement and portfolio 





























































































Notwithstanding these considerations, the fact that the stock of reserves in the 
Bank of Spain has grown considerably during the sample period should be borne in 
mind when interpreting the results, though the lack of low-frequency data for 
reserves and the impossibility of discerning sterilized from non-sterilized intervention 
prevents us from attempting an empirical analysis on the effectiveness of sterilized 
interventions.
II-Empirical evidence for Spain
In this section we undertake an empirical analysis of the Spanish experience 
in the EMS target zone6. We would like to measure the effect of the existence of the 
EMS on the fundamentals; that implies, from an empirical point of view, to explore 
the relationship between (off-shore) interest rates differentials and the exchange rate 
deviations from the central parity, that is the relationship (6,s')- The solid lines in 
Figures 4.a,b show the interest rate differentials (6) and the dashed lines are exchange 
rate deviations from the central parity (s') of Spain with respect to the two countries 
object of our study: Germany and France.
The theoretical (6,s') curve has a negative slope. Further, we have seen that the 
relationship is non-linear for instantaneous rate differentials, becoming more linear 
and less steep as the maturity term increases (see Svensson (1991,b)); for our data set, 
with one month interest rate differentials, a linear relationship may be a good 
approximation which is easily formulated in practice, as in Weber (1991). 
Consequently, the expression equivalent to the basic model's postulate is the 
following:
8,-c,+fos,+er 
Vr—c,-p  ; b<0
[13]
The intercept term, c„ under the original assumptions of the basic model (no 
realignment risk, no capital controls) is constant and equal to the drift of 
fundamentals (p), and the parameter b represents the response of the interest rate 
differentials to the exchange rate deviation from the central parity (s,'); the expected
6-The data are daily from 19/06/89 to 15/09/92 (788 observations), that is, from 
the entrance in the EMS to the first realignment of the Spanish peseta. Sources for the 
data are Servicio de Estadistica (Banco de Espana) and Datastream. Interest rates are 
Euromarkets one-month deposits.The central parities with respect to the German 
Mark and French Franc were set at 65 pts/DM and 19,38 pts/FF, respectively, and 




























































































value of b should be negative, since it conveys the honeymoon effect delivered by the 
target zone in the theoretical model.
Consider first the series 6, and s,' plotted in Figures 4; The scatterplots of both 
variables which appear under the title 'non-adjusted target zone' in Figures 5.A,B. 
(the observed (6,s,') curve) also display a rather diffuse relationship from where no 
definite relation between them can be observed. This would suggest that the 
empirical evidence does not support the basic model and this outcome confirms 
previous findings by Flood, Rose & Mathieson (1991), Weber (1991) among others, 
for other EMS countries, or Rodriguez (1992), for Spain. Exploring the reasons for the 
rejection of the basic model requires a statistical analysis of the series. The results of 
this analysis will also help us to reformulate the structure of the empirical model.
The summary statistics of the differenced series contained in Table 1 show 
several noteworthy points. Firstly, the series present an excess of kurtosis-mainly in 
the interest rate differentials- indicating that they are highly nonnormal; further, the 
column labeled S(0) provides estimates of the spectral densities at zero frequency. As 
noted by several authors, (e.g. Cochrane (1988)), this provides a useful diagnostic on 
the permanent (that is, components with a unit root) and transitory components in 
the series. Judging from point estimates, there seems to be far more persistence, in 
fact accentuation, of shocks in the interest rate differentials, than in the exchange rate 
deviations. On the contrary, the interest rate differentials could exhibit some degree 
of mean reversion towards a downwards trend, and this could lead to the rejection 
of a random walk model. Consequently, we test for the existence of a unit root in the 
autoregressive representation of each series against two alternatives: one consistent 
with fluctuations around a constant mean -r - ,  the other with stationary fluctuations 
around a deterministic linear trend-xT; Table II contains the corresponding 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests; In both cases eight lags are included to account for 
serial correlation.
We can see that there is very little evidence against the unit root hypothesis 
if the considered alternative is stationarity around a constant mean. However, as 
noted above, a more relevant alternative to consider for the interest differentials 
would be stationary fluctuations around a deterministic linear trend. As the results 
show, the French differentials (6F) could be stationary-write l(0)-around a 
deterministic trend, whereas the German differentials (6C) contain a unit root-write 
1(1). Nevertheless, the results of the ADF test for (6F), do not seem too robust, since 
by only changing the number of lags in the tests, one should reject stationarity; i.e the 
ADF(7) gives a result of -3.22. Furthermore, by observing the persistence measures 




























































































differentials the measures are very close to 1, that is, the measure of a pure random 
walk and so in what follows we will treat them as 1(1) variables7. Finally, both 
exchange rate deviations (s'F,s'c) are 1(1).
From these results, a cointegration relationship could be possible, for the four 
series are 1(1), hence we test for it: EG(5) in Table II shows that both series are not 
cointegrated, and as a consequence maintaining a constant parameter for c would 
also imply a unit root in Et. This means that interest rate differentials and exchange 
rate deviations can shift apart without bound. This is what explains the blurred 
relationship between 6 and s, when a constant c, is assumed as displayed in Figures 
5.D.E, and the reason why we formulate a flexible model for c, of the form:
c ,-n f .pc, , < 0(B)r|,
[14]
With p e  [0 ,1] ;  0 ( B ) - 1 - e , f l - e 2f i2- . . . .  £ ( n , ) - 0 | £ ( t i* ) - o *
with all the roots of 0(B)=O lying on or outside the unit circle, where B is the 
backshift operator, such that BSct=x,.k. With this specification, the only restriction that 
is imposed on the model in [13] is that e , follows a white noise process. Given this 
specification, we just have to explore the actual process for c„ given our data set.
The lack of cointegration between the series 6 and s' implies that p equals 1, 
such that c, is 1(1) for both countries. Note that the unit root previously contained in 
the residuals (when c, was constant) is now shifted to the variable parameter c,. The 
second element to determine is the order of 0(B); this is done with the help of the 
autocorrelations of the differenced series, displayed in Table 3. There, we can see that 
for s' an IMA(1,1) process is an acceptable representation, whereas the series 6 seem 
to be well represented by a pure random walk. Therefore, the MA polynomial for c, 
is the sum of a MA(1) and a white noise, and a model for c, consistent with the data 
would be given by an IMA(1,1)- as shown in the Appendix 1- plus a drift (p.c). The 
value of this drift will arise from the estimation below.
Estimation procedure
The aim of this section is to estimate the model with the time-varying 
parameter c, and the time invariant parameter b of model [13], in order to achieve the 
relationship postulated by the theory, by extracting the intercept term component 
from the interest rate differential series 6.
7In order to compute the persistence measures S(0), univariate ARMA(2,2) models 
on the first differences of the series have been estimated, from where we have 
computed the univariate MA expansion, and finally we have evaluated it at B=l. 




























































































Rewriting [13] in the so-called state space form we obtain the following 
expression
V Z .a .+ e .
E(e,)-0 E(e*)-a^;
where 'V -6 l hs\ 
with
Z-\1 0 0 0]; a
and
“,-for 1
' 1 1  e o
jO 1 o o
" o  o o o
0 0 1 0
E(ufit) - IA, the ider
where the unknown parameters b, fd, ar|2, a ,2, and 0 are chosen so that they satisfy 
the restrictions of Appendix 1, and maximize the likelihood function, or equivalently 
the log likelihood:
\ O Q L -h o Q 2 n -WC. r̂-1
[18]
where
er-6  ,-bs ,-Zat/t_,
The first equation is known as the measurement equation, and the second as 
the transition equation. Notice that the unobserved component c, and the drift for its 
process (p.c) are included in the state vector a t.
Having casted the model in State-Space, the Kalman Filter (KF) is a well- 
known method to compute the Gaussian likelihood function for a trial set of 
parameters (for a discussion see, for instance, Harvey (1989)). The filter recursively 
produces minimun mean square error (MMSE) estimates of the unobserved state 
vector given observations on Wt. The filter consists of two sets of equations, the 
prediction and the updating or correction equations. Denoting the optimal 
estimator of a,., based on information up to and including *PM, and letting P,_, denote
E(«,)-0, E(u(u(> 7 4
[15]
,-1g  f , V i l '
[16]
1i v2i v3iJ
o„ 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0
; R' o„ 0 0 0
i 0 0  0 0






























































































the 4x4 covariance matrix of the estimation error, that is:
P, ,-£ [(« ,.,-a, ,)(<*, r a, i)1
the KF consists on the recursive application of the following set of equations to 
extract a value for the state a t:
Prediction Equations
a - Ta I20!
U t / t  1 i Mf l
V , - ” V , r +RQ/r
Parameter correction equations
ZA/I ,
F . 7 P  7 'r t ^ r t / t <
7 'p -* tit-i*' /r /
► a2
ar a,n -,,K ,e,
P -P  - K 7 P1 i 1 i/t-i ■lNz'r i/i-i
where the subscript t/t-1 indicates that the optimal estimators for P and a are at time 
t are computed with the information available at time t-1. Given initial values a,, P„ 
the filter computes the estimate at for a, at time t={l,2....,T}. In order to compute these 
initial values several alternatives are offered in the literature, as for instance the one 
devised by de Jong (1988) (see Appendix 2), which has been the one used here. 
Maximization of the log likelihood of the above state space model gives the results 
summarized in Table 4.
Figure 5,C shows the intercept terms c, for Germany and France and the right 
plot of figures 5,A,B display the adjusted interest rate differentials (6adi) obtained by 
substracting c, from 6„ that is, with the differentials net of the intercept term. Two 
results are worth underlining: Firstly, the sign of the response parameter b is 
negative, as the theory states, though its value is very small-see the slope of the 
(bai’,s') scatterplot-, highlighting the scarce influence of the band on the interest rate 
differentials (For France the band would explain 6,15% of the differentials; for 
Germany only 1,42%). Secondly, and as a consequence of the previous result, the 
term c, accounts for most of the differentials (the residuals (et) are white noise and 
of small magnitude-see Fig.5.D). Next we turn to the interpretation of these results.
Ill-Exploring the intercept: credibility
The disappointing results of the target zone model are partially explained by 




























































































the exchange rate will appreciate when it approaches the upper band, and viceversa; 
this suggest that the exchange rate is expected to revert to the interior of the band. 
However, the non-stationarity of s' indicates that the exchange rate does not display 
such mean reversion; thus, the position of the currency in the band cannot greatly 
influence the interest rate differentials8.
Another comment can further justify our results. Recall that in the empirical 
model we use deviations from the central parity-multiplied by a parameter to 
estimate b- (fas'), as an approximation to the exchange rate expectation within the 
band. On the other hand, since we are using Euromarket rates, it is reasonable to 
accept the fulfilment of the UCP. Then, if realignment risks are dismissed, the absence 
of a cointegrating relationship between s' and 6 would imply that the uncovered 
differentials contain a unit root. Accordingly,what c, picks up is precisely the 
realignment risk underlying the agents' expectations (c,=g,) and hence, bs' turns out 
to be a very poor approximation to the overall exchange rate expectation. The 
behaviour of c, very close to 5, shows that the interest rate differentials have reflected 
this implicit realignment risk, rather than the expectations derived from the position 
of the currency in the band.
The obvious conclusion to obtain from this analysis is that the band has not 
been completely credible during the sample under study. However, the decreasing 
profile of c, points out that the zone has gained credibility throughout the period, but 
for the last months, just before the effective realignment-as if anticipating it.
Although the unobserved components approach applied here is a credibility 
test in itself, we would like to assess the question of credibility on a more robust 
basis, applying to our data set the test devised by Svensson (1993) in which an 
explicit expected rate of realignment is estimated9.
This test is easily formulated from [11] and interpreting#, as the expected rate 
of realignment. Note that we only have to compute the expectation on the exchange 
rate conditional on no realignment; since the interest rates in the data set have a 
maturity of one month (= 20 observations) the regression to estimate is the following:
'-We should be cautious at this stage, since the lack of mean reversion can also 
be influenced by the wide band in which the peseta is allowed to fluctuate. For 
instance, Svensson (1993) rejects that s' are 1(1) for all the EMS original currencies, but 
the Italian Lira, that is, the generally acknowledged less reputed currency in the EMS, 
but also the only one fluctuating within a wide band.
9-An alternative test, also conceived by Svensson (1991,a), and applied to the 
Spanish peseta by Rodriguez (1992) and Ayuso et al. (1993) gives sufficient but no 
necessary conditions for rejecting that the band is credible, since it only accepts that 




























































































( L r t*h g rtm rv )~ ^ S l , l -2 o” m o + m iS  |t l U l [22]
Taking expectations and substracting them from the interest rate differentials, 
an expected rate of realignment would be obtained. Comparing this result with [10], 
we can observe that this expected rate of realignment is an alternative way to 
estimate g,-the realignment risk. Note, however, that the previous integrability analysis 
prevents us from carrying out this regression, since the exchange rate is 1(1), and 
consequently the parameter m, is not significatively different from zero10. This 
means that, under this approach the expectation on the exchange rate conditional on 
no realignment is zero, and consequently, the expected rate of realignment is simply 
the interest rate differential.
This peculiar result reinforces rather than weakens our previous comments: as a 
matter of fact, it is no wonder that comparing the outcome of the Svensson test with 
the interpretation of c, as a realignment risk, we obtain very similar estimates of gr 
The reason is that underlying both approaches is the assumption that the expected 
exchange rate depreciation within the band is given by the position of the exchange 
rate in it. As we have seen, the data are not supportive of this hypothesis and that 
is why the estimated realignment risk virtually matches the interest rate differentials.
Despite the apparent robustness of this result we have to be extremely cautious 
to interpret the whole interest rate differential as a realignment risk. As Ayuso et al. 
(1993) point out, the expected realignment rate -or in its case c, -picks up expected 
exchange rate regime shifts, and this change in the implicit regime can actually occur 
while keeping the same central parity (for instance, a jump from the lower to the 
upper part of the same band). This implies that the interest rate differentials would 
overestimate the realignment risk; note that this possibility is even more likely in the 
case of a wide band.
Conclusions and final remarks
The results of the Kalman Filter -implemented to explore the importance of the 
band in the behaviour of the interest rate differentials- have been interpreted in the 
previous section. The main conclusion is that we do not find enough empirical 
evidence to support the target zone hypothesis for Spain. We have seen that the
'“-The estimation of As'„2„ instead of As',,,- as in the integrability analysis- does 
not have any implication for the value of m,. Further, Lopez (1993), using the 
asymptotic distributions of the DF statistic, shows that the standard Dickey-Fuller 
critical values have to be multiplied by a correction factor of 1.22, when the number 




























































































target zone has hardly influenced the interest rate differentials of Spain respect to 
Germany and France and these interest rate differentials have largely reflected risks 
of realignment (or risks of effective regime shifts); the parameter c,, which contains 
a unit root, conveys this risk and basically explains the differentials. However, the 
evolution of c„ along with other factors which caracterize the period under 
consideration (reduction of interest differentials, strength of the peseta in the band, 
growth of the Spanish stock of reserves), demand some additional comments.
First of all, recall from [9] that the realignment risk can be decomposed into 
two components: the expected size of realignment and the probability attached to it 
(p). One can accept taht the magnitude of the realignment depends on the 
expectations that agents assign to the evolution of the fundamentals, on their actual 
evolution and on the difference between these two; this component should behave 
smoothly in absence of news. On the contrary, the second component-the probability 
attached by the agents to a realignment- can be highly volatile, and a jump in p can 
trigger a self-sustained process resulting in a proper speculative attack.
Secondly, the variability showed by c, and, especially, its progressive reduction 
until mid-1992 reveal the existence of several elements determine its evolution. On 
the one hand, nominal convergence is reflected in the reduction of the interest 
differentials and, consequently, of the realignment risk; on the other hand, the process 
of financial integration implemented during this period, in conjunction with sterilized 
interventions (announcement effect) may have allowed meaningful gains in the 
credibility of the exchange rate commitment; these gains have been reflected in the 
lower probability of the current band being abandoned-at least in the short run- and, 
consequently, in a lower realignment risk.
Finally, these factors which allow for the reduction in c, appear to vanish 
around the end of the period (Summer '92): the deviations of the fundamentals from 
the policy targets, the general instability in the EMS and the uncertainties of the 
Monetary Union (elements which can be seen as positive shocks on p) swiftly erode 
the previous credibility gains and the term c, displays a change of trend; in terms of 
the above interpretation, the probability of a realignment which bridges the gap in 
the fundamentals, begin to increase. This increase in the realignment risk cannot be 
stopped either by the increase in the interest rate differentials nor by the depreciation 
of the currency within the band nor by the massive sell of reserves, and results in the 
strong speculative pressures which ended up causing the first realignment of the 






























































































6 , - c + b s + c ,
where 6, and s', are observable but c, and e, are not. For simplicity and without loss 
of generality the drifts have been set equal to zero. If one of them is different from 
zero the resulting model for c, will contain also a drift equal to that. If both 6, and 
s', have drift, the resulting drift will be that of 6 minus that of s'
Assume also that e , is a white noise process serially and contemporaneously 
uncorrelated with c„ and s',. Assume also that the process for 6, and s', are known 
to be:
A 6 r-»r,; A s > v,-Yvm  
a 2iv, o 2. known
applying first differences in the original model we therefore obtain:




Acr wr bv+brr\,_, -At ,
Notice that the right hand side (r.h.s) of the above equation is the sum of a 
white noise process and two MA(1) processes, one of them with a unit root, and in 
consequence the r.h.s will itself be a MA(1), given say, by (l-0B)r)„ with E(q)=0 and 
E(r)2)=on2. These last parameters have to satisfy the constraints implied by equating 
the autocovariances of the l.h.s. and r.h.s. of the above equation. The variance and 
first autocovariance yield the system:
(1 +02) o 2- o 2n+b2o 2.+b2 y2ô .+2of




























































































and for further lags equal to zero.
Assume now that b is known, and denote:
x: - a 2n+bza 2v( 1 +v2)
u2 2x2- b yo,
with all the terms in x, and x2 known.
However, the system is underidentified, since we have two equation with three 
unknowns. In fact the most we can do is to solve the system for two of the unknowns 
in terms of the third one. Choosing at2 as the latter and solving for the former we 
get:
1
chosing 0, such that I0I<1 
with
, _ - V 2tU
2x2+ot
also
It is also immediate to prove that 2s j z | and since 0,02=1, one of the 0s is 
always in absolute value less or equal to 1. Finally since crt2 is not known, it is 
chosen so that that the log likelihood is maximized.
Appendix 2
In principle the starting values for the KF a0 and P0, are given by the mean and 
the covariance matrix of the unconditional distribution of the state vector. However 
when the state equation is nonstationary the unconditional distribution of the state 
vector is not defined. Unless genuine prior information is available, the initial 
distribution of a 0 must be specified in terms of a diffuse prior. If we write P0=kI, 
where k is a positive scalar, the diffuse prior is obtained as k->°o. This corresponds 
with Po’=0. The distribution is an improper one since it does not integrate to one. 
However, as Gomez and Maravall (1993) note, the use of the so called big k method 
is not only numerically dangerous but also inexact. Alternative initialization 
procedures can be found in de Jong (1988) (the one used), Carraro & Sartore (1987) 
and Gomez & Maravall (1993). In de Jong's algorithm it is assummed that the initial 






























































































where Yi is a Dxl vector containing the D non stationary elements, with a diffuse 
prior, that is Var(Y,)='»I or [Var(Y,)]'’=0, while an N-Dxl vector has a proper 
prior, that is,
E(Y2)=m Var(Y2)=V
In our model with stationary errors m is a 3X1 where the first element is set 
equal to a consistent estimate of /i and the two other elements are zero, while V is 
diagonal matrix with zero the first element of the diagonal os as given in Appendix 
1; Yi would be set equal to c, while y2=[m hi ht-i]’; C,=[l 0 0 0]' and C:=[0 I,]'. The use 
of the big k approximation for y, is avoided by extending the KF as follows. Define
Xt=[<Pt 0]
where 0 in [.] is a null matrix with D columns, (so in the model D=l). Then the 
standard KF recursions would be initiated with
P°,io=C2VC2'
The recursion for the state vector is augmented so as to become a recursion for the 
matrices A, and At| defined as:




with A, |0=[C2m C,] 
and
St=St.,+NtF,-'Nt t= l T
with S„=0
The output from the above recursions is used to construct the required statistics from 
the diffuse prior model as follows. First, partition N„ A, and St as follows:
N,=[vt° N*t], A,=[at° A4,] and S,=[Stt S2t]' with 
S„=[S4t° s\'] S21=[s*t S*J
































































































where S*,‘ is the generalized inverse of S*r
The log likelihood function, ignoring the constant term, is given by
£,=-*41In | F, | -V&'°-Y&n | s*T | +V4s*T'S V ,s*T
The expression for the log likelihood assumes that the KF recursions are 
carried on until the end of the sample. However once S\ becomes nonsingular the 
diffuse filter can be collapsed to the usual filter. If S*t is nonsingular at some point 
t=x, then the usual KF can be employed starting from values obtained for a, and P, 
for t=x.
It can be shown that S+, is non singular if 
r[C,'Z', CI'T'Z',C1'T'T,Z',..../C,T'...Z']=D
Since in our particular case r(C,'Z')=l, we can truncate at x=l, and the log likelihood 
function for the T observations becomes
£=£,-142In | F, | -*42et'Ft 'et
with £, defined as above and the sums evaluated only at t=l.
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Table I- Statistics of the daily changes in the series
Mean SD Skew Ex. Kurt S(0)
aôg -.001
(.005)















.246 .3405 1.715 
(.087) (.174)
.73
Newey--West Standard errors in brackets.
Table II-Augmented Dickey Fuller tests
6c sG S F
tm(8) - 1 . 48 1.12 -2.39 -1.04
i,(8) - 1 . 90 1.08 -3.48 -.087
EG(5) -1.18 -2.48
Numbers for xv are t statistics on p„ in the regression Axt=«+poxt_ 
^SjPjAXj.j. Number for t, are t statistics on po in the regression 
Axt=a+a1t+P0xt_1+2jPjAxt_:j. Critical values at 5% are -2.86 for xM 
and -3.41 for t,. EG(5), is the t-statistic of the residuals of 
the cointegrating regression of 6 on s, critical value at the 5% 
-3.34.
Table Ill-Autocorrelations of the differenced series
lag 1 2 3 4 5
Aôg .02 roo -.04 -.06 .00
Asg -.11 .04 -.08 .00 -.04
Aòf .07 .01 -.00 -.05 .04





























































































Table IV- Results of the analysis
b a , 2 e <
GERMANY -.0217 .056 .44 .00018 .1273
(.0113) (.017)
FRANCE -.0556 .052 .44 .0003 .1168
(.0120) (0.018)
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